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INTRODUCTION

On July 16, 2009, Sergeant James Crowley of the Cambridge Police
Department investigated a potential break-in at a home near Harvard University.I
When Crowley arrived at the home, the 911 caller-who remained on an
adjacent sidewalk after making the call -told him she had witnessed two men
on the porch of the home and that one of them had "wedg[ed] his shoulder into
the door as if he was trying to force entry."3 Crowley went to the front door and
asked a suspect inside the house to "step out onto the porch."4 CTowley and the
suspect's attorney provided somewhat different accounts of the ensuing
incident however, when the suspect did not submit to the officer's request,
Crowley apparently questioned the suspect inside the house and later arrested

I. See generally James Crowley, Cambridge Police Dep't, Incident Report No. 9005127
(July 16, 2009). available at http://www.volokl.com/2009/07/20/arrest-of-harvard-prof-henrylouis-gates-jr! (detailing the incident); see also Andr6 Douglas Pond Cummings, Post Racialism?,
14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 601, 622 24 (2011) (describing the circumstances surrounding the
incident); Abby Goodnough, Harvard Professor Jailed. Officer Is Accused of Bias, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 2009, at A13 (describing the circumstances surrounding the incident): Krissah Thompson,
Harvard Professor Arrested at Home; Police Report Says Henry Gates Called Officers Racist,
WASH. POST, July 21, 2009, at A4 (identifying the location of the home as "near Harvard
University").
2.
See Crowley, supra note 1.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.; see also Cummings, supra note 1, at 622 (describing the encounter); Charles
Ogletree, Statement on Behalf of Henry Louis Gates, Jr., RoOT (July 20, 2009, 7:26 PM),
http://www.theroot.con/views/lawyers-stateinent-arrest-henry -louis-gates-jr (providing a rendition
of events espoused by the suspect's attorney).
5.
Compare Crowley, supra note I (describing the suspect as combative and highly
skeptical of Crowley's intentions), with Ogletree, supra note 4 (describing Crowley's conduct as
intrusive and cryptic); see also Cummings, supra note 1, at 622-23 (discussing the disputed facts).
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him after both men finally departed to the front porch.6 According to his
attorney, the suspect spent about four hours in the Cambridge police station after
his arrest.
Perhaps this rendition of a summertime encounter with the law indicates a
routine police response to criminal activity-certainly nothing worthy of
international media attention, a statement by the president of Harvard University,
and increased consumption of alcoholic beverages by America's political
leaders. 8 However, certain additional details reveal the basis for a national
controversy: the "suspect" in this case was African-American scholar Henry
Louis Gates, Jr., of Harvard University, who broke into his own home after
finding the front door jammed and was subsequently arrested on his front porch
by a white police officer.9 Allegations of racial profiling abounded after the
incident. 10 In the ensuing turmoil, Gates demanded an apology, bloggers
accused the 911 caller of racism, and President Barack Obama accused the police
of "act[ing] stupidly."
President Obama eventually convened a "beer summit"

6.
See Crowley, supra note 1; Ogletree, snpra note 4.
7.
Ogletree, supra note 4; see also Cummings, supra note 1, at 623 (supporting the
attorney's contention that the police released the suspect after four hours of detention).
8.
But ef John Lauerman, Gates Police ConfrontationEnds With Charge Dropped (Update
1), BLOOMBERG (July 21, 2009, 5:16 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news'pid-newsarchive
&sid=anupUHzw.FOY (noting the international news coverage of the incident and describing the
response by Harvard University's president); Katie Zezima & Abby Goodnough, ChargesAgainst
Black HarvardProfessorAre Dropped,but He Seeks Officer's Apology, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2009,
at A12 (noting that Harvard University president Drew Gilpin Faust stated that she was "deeply
troubled by the incident" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Helene Cooper & Abby Goodnough,
In a Reunion over Beers, -NoApologies, but Cordial Plans to Have Lunch Sometime, N.Y. TIEvS,
July 31, 2009, at A10 (describing the White House "beer summit" involving President Barack
Obama, Vice President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Sergeant Crowlev, and the suspect).
9.
See Crowley, supra note 1; see also Cummings, supra note 1, at 622 (describing the
supposed "break-in" and noting Gates's credentials); Goodnough, supra note 1, at A13 (noting the
circumstances behind the "break-in"); Jay Lindsay, Lucia Whalen, 911 Caller in Gates Case,
Speaks Publicly, HUFFINGTON POST (July 29, 2009, 10:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2009/07/29/lucia-w halen-911-caller-i n 246919.html (noting the scope of the controversy).
Crowley arrested Gates for disorderly conduct rather than a crime against property. See Crowley,
supra note I; see also Cummings, supra note 1, at 622 23 (elaborating on the grounds for the
arrest). Gates showed Crowley his Harvard identification card, and Crowley reported that he "was
led to believe that Gates was lawfully in the residence." Crowley, supra note 1. But see Ogletree,
snpra note 4 (alleging that Gates also showed Crowley his driver's license and noting that the
license included Gates's address). However, Crowley alleged that Gates continually shouted claims
of racial bias at him: thus, Crowley was able to arrest Gates for disorderly conduct once Gates
exited the house. See Crowley, supra note 1; Cummings, supra note 1, at 623. But see Ogletree,
supra note 4 (providing the rendition of the events espoused by Gates's attorney).
10. See Lindsay supra note 9; see also Cummings, supra note 1, at 624 ("[T]he incident
starkly reminded all thoughtful observers of the pervasive disparate treatment that minority
Americans face when confronted by the U.S. criminal justice system."); Goodnough, supra note 1,
at A13 (noting Harvard faculty members' allegations of racial profiling).
I1. Lindsay, supra note 9 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cummings, supra note
1. at 623 (noting the controversy following President Obama's remarks). The 911 caller. Lucia
Whalen, was actually "a first-generation Portuguese-American wvho [did not] live in the area";
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at the White House, at which the President and Vice President discussed the
conflict with Gates and Crowley.
Analyses of the arrest and ensuing controversy tended to focus on its racial
components. I However, a slight variation of the factual situation presents
another interesting issue: if the caller had known Gates was breaking into his
own residence, would she still have had reason to notify the police? In other
words, "Can a person burglarize his own home?" 1 4
In South Carolina, the answer to this question depends on the nature of the
person's interest in the home.5 On the one hand, the South Carolina Supreme
Court has established that a defendant cannot burglarize the "home" in which he
has a possessory interest and an expectation of safety and security. 16 However,
in the recent case State v. Singley, ' the court clarified that, as a matter of law, an
ownership interest in the "home" does not prohibit conviction for this offense.i
Thus, in South Carolina, a person can burglarize his own real property-but only
if the person lacks the requisite possessory and security interests therein.
This Comment argues that, while consistent with the historical and
multijurisdictional definition of burglary as a crime against possession and while
appropriately protective of the possessor's expectation of peaceful inhabitance,
the South Carolina Supreme Court's ruling in Singley could be further refined by
the addition of protections for certain absentee property owners. Part II
describes the Singley decision and the court's basis for reaching it. Part III
discusses the historical foundations of burglary law and asserts that the court's
decision in Singley is firmly grounded in a tradition that defines burglary as a
crime against habitation. Likewise, Part IV discusses current burglary laws
across the United States and concludes that the court's decision is consistent with
the majority approach. Part V proposes a revision to the Singley test, tinder
which an absentee property owner who can enter the home without causing harm
to the possessor and who can expect to enjoy the premises safely and securely
cannot be convicted of burglary. This revision would retain the protections of
the possessor enumerated in Singley while also protecting property owners who

Whalen called the police at the behest of an elderly woman. Lindsay, supra note 9. According to
Whalen's attorney 'Whalen's accusers had mislabeled her as a wealthy white woman. Id.
12. See Cooper & Goodnough, supra note 8, at A10; see also Cummings, supra note 1, at
623-24 (criticizing the "beer summit" method of conflict resolution).
13. See, e.g., Lindsay, supra note 9 (noting that the arrest "sparked a national debate over
racial profiling and police conduct"); see also Cummings, supra note 1, at 622 24 (describing the
incident in terms of racial conflict); Thompson, supra note 1. at A4 (describing an analysis of the
incident's racial aspects).
14. People v. Gauze, 542 P.2d 1365, 1365 (Cal. 1975).
15. See State v. Singley, 392 S.C. 270, 276-77, 709 S.E.2d 603, 606-07 (2011) (quoting
State v. Brooks, 277 S.C. 111, 112-13. 283 S.E.2d 830, 831 (1981); State v. Trapp, 17 S.C. 467.,
470 (1882)).
16. See id. at 276-77. 709 S.E.2d at 606.
17. 392 S.C. 270, 709 S.E.2d 603 (2011).
18. See id. at 278. 709 S.E.2d at 607.
19. See id. at 276-77, 709 S.E.2d at 606.
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have not threated the personal safety of the possessor-therefore aligning the
court's decision with one of the key justifications for burglary law. Part VI
concludes with further analysis of the Henry Louis Gates anecdote.
11.

THE SINGLEY TEST

On October 2, 2005, Ferris Geiger Singley committed a burglary.20 Though
much less controversial than the pseudo-burglary that Professor Gates
committed. Singley's actions were far more dangerous.
At about 2:30 a.m..
Singley entered a Charleston County home through a rear window, and when the
house's inhabitant returned. Singley seized her. held a knife to her throat. and
ordered her to give him money.23 After the victim complied with Singley's
demand, he tied her to a bed and fled the premises.2 4 The victim eVentualy
freed herself and called the police from a neighbor's house.
Before the day
was over, the police found Singley and arrested him.26 Singley was then indicted
for several criminal offenses, including first degree burglary.
In early May
2006, he was tried by a jury in Charleston County before Circuit Court Judge R.
Knox McMahon. 28
The background details of this burglary further dramatize Singley's
narrative. The victim was Singley's mother, and the dwelling burglarized was
Singley's childhood home.29 Singley lived in the home for the first two decades
of his life, eventually moving out in his early twenties.30 He returned home in
April 2005 and lived there "until his mother 'put him out' of the house" three

20. See Brief of Respondent at 3, Singley, 392 S.C. 270, 709 S.E.2d 603 (No. 26954), 2010
WL 5398789. at *3.
21. See generally Goodnough, supra note 1, at A13 (describing the circumstances
surrounding Gates's arrest).
22. See Singley, 392 S.C. at 272. 709 S.E.2d at 604.
23. Id.; see also Brief of Respondent, supra note 20, at 3 (describing the facts of the case).
24. Singlev, 392 S.C. at 272, 709 S.E.2d at 604; Brief of Respondent, supra note 20, at 3.
25. Singlev, 392 S.C. at 272, 709 S.E.2d at 604.
26. Id.; Brief of Respondent, supra note 20, at 3.
27. Singley, 392 S.C. at 272. 709 S.E.2d at 604. For the definition of the offense of first
degree burglary in South Carolina, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-311 (2003). In addition to
burglary, Singley was indicted for armed robbery and kidnapping. See Singley, 392 S.C. at 272, 709
S.E.2d at 604.
28. See Brief of Respondent, supra note 20, at 3; Brief of Petitioner at 4, Singley, 392 S.C.
270, 709 S.E.2d 603 (No. 26954), 2010 WE 5398788, at *4.
29. Singley, 392 S.C. at 272, 709 S.E.2d at 604.
30. Id. Singley was thirty-eight years old when he committed the burglary. See Record on
Appeal at 2, Singley, 392 S.C. 270, 709 S.E.2d 603 (No. 26954) (on file with author). Singley's age
at the time of the burglary can be inferred from his age at the time of the trial-thirty-eight,
according to his mother-wvhich occurred on May 1 and 2. 2006. See id.; Brief of Petitioner, supra
note 28, at 4.
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weeks later. 3 After this point, "Singley did not have permission to return to the
house."
However, several years before the incident, Singley inherited a 12.5%
interest in the house from his father via intestate succession. Armed with the
argument that-due to his property interest-he could enter the house without
consent from his mother, Singley moved for a directed verdict on the burglary
charge at trial, asserting that the State failed to meet its burden of proof on the
consent aspect of South Carolina's burglar) law.1 Despite Singley's arguments,
the circuit court denied his motion.35 The jury returned a guilty verdict on the
burglary charge, and Singley appealed, arguing that the court improperly denied
his motion for a directed verdict.36
In an opinion written by Judge Short, the South Carolina Court of Appeals
began its analysis by construing South Carolina's first degree burglary statute.
A person may only be found guilty of burglary under this statute if, inter alia,
that person "enters a dwelling without consent and with intent to commit a crime
in the dwelling." 8 The court noted that, for the purposes of the burglary statute,

31. Singlev, 392 S.C. at 272, 709 S.E.2d at 604.
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 272-73, 709 S.E.2d at 604; Brief of Respondent, supra note 20, at 4-5; see also
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-31 1(A) (2003) (listing entry without consent as a necessary element of
burglary). Singley moved for a directed verdict on the other charges as well. Singley, 392 S.C. at
272, 709 S.E.2d at 604.
35. Singlev, 392 S.C. at 273, 709 S.E.2d at 604.
36. Id. (citing State v. Singley, 383 S.C. 441, 442 43, 679 S.E.2d 538, 539 (Ct. App. 2009),
aff'd, 392 S.C. 270, 709 S.E.2d 603 (2011)); see also Singley, 383 S.C. at 443, 679 S.E.2d at 540
(quoting State v. Weston. 367 S.C. 279, 292-93, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006)) (enumerating the
standard of review for a court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict). The jury also found
Singley guilty of armed robbery, but acquitted him on the kidnapping charge. Singley, 392 S.C. at
273, 709 S.E.2d at 604. Singley appealed the burglary conviction only. Id. (citing Singley, 383 S.C.
at 443, 679 S.E.2d at 539).
37. See Singley, 383 S.C. at 442-44, 679 S.E.2d at 539 40 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11311(A)).
38. Id. at 443. 679 S.E.2d at 540 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-311(A)). The portion of
the statute that the court construed provides as follows:
A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree if the person enters a dwelling without
consent and with intent to commit a crime in the dwelling, and either:
(1) when, in effecting entry or while in the dwelling or in immediate flight, he or
another participant in the crime:
(a) is armed with a deadly weapon or explosive: or
(b) causes physical injury to a person w1io is not a participant in the crime; or
(c) uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument, or
(d) displays what is or appears to be a knife, pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine
gun, or other firearm or
(2) the burglary is committed by a person with a prior record of two or more
convictions for burglary or housebreaking or a combination of both; or
(3) the entering or remaining occurs in the nighttime.
Id. at 443-44. 679 S.E.2d at 540 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-311(A)). Thus. in addition to
the entering and intent elements, the potential burglar must also satisfy at least one other statutory
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the relevant "consent" is that of "the person in lawful possession" of the
dwelling.3 The court then asserted that, although neither the South Carolina
Code nor the relevant case law contain a definition of "lawful possession," the
South Carolina Supreme Court traditionally addressed burglary in terms of its
effects on possession rather than ownership.4 0 The court noted that tribunals in
North Carolina and Georgia also rejected the ownership-based definition of
burglary in favor of definitions based upon possession.41
Thus, the South Carolina Court of Appeals concluded that Singley's
ownership interest alone did not make him a person in "lawful possession" of the
dwelling.42 The court then held that, while Singley's mother lawfully possessed
the dwelling, Singley did not-a fact "most notably evidenced by Singley's
acknowledgment of his mother's right to occupancy and possession by his
acquiescence to her demand for him to vacate the house in April 2005."43
Finding no error in the denial of Singley's motion for a directed verdict, the

element to be convicted. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-l1-311(A). While some of these other elements
describe conduct, others do not-a person may satisfy one of the elements simply by entering in the
nighttime. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-311(A)(3).
39. Singlev, 383 S.C. at 444, 679 S.E.2d at 540 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-310(3)
(2003)) (internal quotation mark omitted). The statute to which the court cited is a definitional
statute that applies to South Carolina's burglary laws. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-310.
40. Singlev, 383 S.C. at 444, 679 S.E.2d at 540 (quoting State v. Brooks, 277 S.C. I, 112,
283 S.E.2d 830, 831 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Trapp, 17 S.C.
467, 471 (1882) (noting in dicta that burglary is a crime against habitation, though the alleged
inhabitant need not be the person who occupies the house at the time of the burglary); ef State v.
Miller, 225 S.C. 21, 26, 80 S.E.2d 354, 356 (1954) (identifying "housebreaking" as a crime agaimst
possession).
41. See Singley, 383 S.C. at 446, 679 S.E.2d at 541: see also State v. Harold, 325 S.E.2d 219.
222 (N.C. 1985) ("[O]ccupation or possession of a dwelling is equivalent to ownership, and actual
ownership of the premises need not be proved." (citing State v. Beaver, 229 S.E.2d 179, 181-82
(N.C. 1976))); Murphy v. State, 234 S.E.2d 911, 914 (1977) (quoting Jones v. State, 75 Ga. 825,
827 (1885)) (citing Trice v. State, 42 S.E. 1008. 1008 (Ga. 1902)) (noting that, under Georgia case
law, the state must prove occupation rather than ownership).
42. See Singlev, 383 S.C. at 446, 679 S.E.2d at 541. Before analyzing Singley's case, the
court also discussed South Carolina burglary cases involving master-servant relationships, as well
as the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in the 1998 burglary case of State v. Coffin. See id.
at 445-46, 679 S.E.2d at 541 (quoting State v. Coffin, 331 S.C. 129, 130-32, 502 S.E.2d 98, 98 99
(1998); State v. Bee, 29 S.C. 81, 83, 6 S.E. 911, 912 (1888)) (citing State v. Howard, 64 S.C. 344,
348-49, 42 S.E. 173, 175 (1902)). Before Singley, Coffin was the only case in which the court
considered a defendant's property interest in the dwelling burglarized under South Carolina's
burglary law. See State v. Singley, 392 S.C. 270, 275, 709 S.E.2d 603, 605 (2011); see also Cofin,
331 S.C. at 132. 502 S.E.2d at 99 (holding that the issue of defendant's property interest presented a
jury question and that defendant's motion for a directed verdict was properly denied). However,
unlike Singley the defendant in Coffin apparently did not have ain undivided property right to the
dwelling: rather, the evidence indicated he was a house guest "[whose] rights were dependent solely
on [the lawful possessor's] good graces." Singley, 392 S.C. at 275, 709 S.E.2d at 606; see also
Coffin, 331 S.C. at 131-32, 502 S.E.2d at 99 (identifying the burglary victim-who was also
defendant's girliriend-as "a person in lawful possession" of the dwelling burglarized). Thus,
Singlev gave the South Carolina Supreme Court ain opportunity to address property matters beyond
the scope of its Coffin decision.
43. Singley, 383 S.C. at 446-47, 679 S.E.2d at 541.
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court affirmed Singley's conviction. 44 Once again, Singley appealed, and the
South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The court decided the case
on April 4, 2011, in an opinion written by Justice Hearn.4 6
Like the court of appeals, the South Carolina Supreme Court noted historical
support for the "possessory" approach to burglary present in South Carolina case
law, 47 as well as the possession-based definitions of burglary applied in
neighboring jurisdictions.48 While the court acknowledged that "[i]t is axiomatic
that 'one cannot commit the offence of burglary by breaking into his own home
[sic],"' 49 the court construed the phrase "own home" in terms of the policy
rationale underlying burglary law. Because "[t]he law of burglary is primarily
designed to secure the sanctity of one's home, especially at nighttime, when
peace, solitude and safety are most desired and expected,", the court asserted
that burglary law protects the inhabitant's right to safety and security in the
dwelling rather than the owner's property interest in the home. Thus, the court
concluded that "the proper test is whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, a burglary defendant had custody and control of, and the right
and expectation to be safe and secure in, the dwelling burglarized."53

44. Id. at 447, 679 S.E.2d at 542.
45. See Singley, 392 S.C. at 271-72, 709 S.E.2d at 604. On appeal to the South Carolina
Supreme Court, Singley argued that he did have a right to possession of the dwelling, as his mother
had not formally terminated his right to occupy the dwelling. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 28,
at 7. This argument is considered in more detail below. See infra text accompanying notes 198204.
46. See Singlev, 392 S.C. at 270-71, 709 S.E.2d at 603.
47. See id. at 274, 709 S.E.2d at 605 (citing State v. Clamp, 225 S.C. 89, 102. 80 S.E.2d 918.
924 (1954); State v. Alford, 142 S.C. 43, 45, 140 S.E. 261, 262 (1927): State v. Trapp, 17 S.C. 467,
471 (1882)); see also supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (outlining the court of appeals'
discussion of South Carolina precedent). Before analyzing South Carolina case law, the court also
addressed the relevant burglary statutes discussed by the court of appeals. See Singley, 392 S.C. at
274, 709 S.E.2d at 605 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11- 3 10( 3 )(a), -311(A)(3) (2003)).
48. See Singley, 392 S.C. at 274-75, 709 S.E.2d at 605; see also supra note 41 and
accompanying text (noting the court of appeals' acknowledgement of other jurisdictions'
approaches). Additionally. the court distinguished Singley's ownership rights from those of the
defendant in State v. Coffin, wvho did not have an undivided property right to the dwelling
burglarized. See supra note 42 (discussing the factual differences between Singlev and Cofin).
49. Singlev, 392 S.C. at 276, 709 S.E.2d at 606 (quoting Trapp, 17 S.C. at 470).
50. See id.
51. Id. (quoting State v. Brooks. 277 S.C. 111, 112, 283 S.E.2d 830, 831 (1981)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
52. See id. The court also referred to cases fi-om New Hampshire and Ohio containing
similar policy rationales for burglary law, as well as a California case involving a possession-based
definition of burglary See People v. Smith, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 378, 384 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting
People v. Clayton, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536, 538 n.3 (Ct. App. 1998)); State v. Lilly, 717 N.E.2d 322,
327 (Ohio 1999); State v. McMillan. 973 A.2d 287, 292 (N.H. 2009).
53. Singley, 392 S.C. at 277. 709 S.E.2d at 606. The court noted the similarity of this test to
the New Hampshire Supreme Court's approach to burglary law; under McMillan, the finder of fact
"must look beyond legal title and evaluate the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a
[burglary] defendant had license or privilege to enter." Id. (quoting MAcMillan, 973 A.2d at 292)
(internal quotation mark omitted).
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Using this test, the court held that the trial court judge properly submitted
the case to the jury.5 According to the court, "A reasonable jury could conclude
that Singley did not have any expectation of peace and security in the dwelling at
issue nor custody and control of it, despite his ownership interest."5 The court
noted that Singley left the dwelling upon his mother's request, found a new
residence, and failed to return to the dwelling until he entered through a window
six months later-indicating the dwelling was not Singley's "own home."56
Thus, the court affirmed the judgment of the South Carolina Court of Appeals.
Singley lost his case-and the possession-based definition of burglary
prevailed.58
111. SINGLEYTN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Viewed solely as an extension of the traditional English definition of
burglary,59 the South Carolina Supreme Court's Singley test60 constitutes a
sensible application of common law principles.61 Originally, the dwelling
protected by burglary law was called a "mansion house" -a term that included
any type of dwelling. 6 Thus, according to Coke, "every housejbr the dwelling
and habitationof man is taken to be a mansion-house, wherein burglary may be

54. See id. at 277. 709 S.E.2d at 607. In reaching this conclusion, the court construed the
facts in a "light most favorable to the State," per the standard of review for directed verdict motions.
Id. at 273, 709 S.E.2d at 604 (citing State v. Paiis, 363 S.C. 477, 481, 611 S.E.2d 501, 503 (2005)).
55. Id. at 277. 709 S.E.2d at 607. While the court previously defined the relevant property
elements as "custody and control of, and the right and expectation to be safe and secure in, the
dwelling burglarized" the court joined the elements with the word "nor" in its analysis of Singley's
case. Id. (emphasis added). This distinction will be discussed in more detail below. See inftra Part
V.
56. Singlev, 392 S.C. at 277-78, 709 S.E.2d at 607 (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. See id. Chief Justice Toal, and Justices Pleicones, Beatty, and Kittredge concurred, no
Justice offered a separate opinion. See id.
58. See id.
59.

See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 223

(photo. reprint 1979) (1769) (providing the traditional definition of burglary) 3 EDWARD COKE,
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 63 (London, Flesher 1644) ("A Burglar ... is by the
[c]ommon law a felon, that in the night breaketh and entreth into a mansion house of another, of
intent to kill some reasonable creature, or to commit some other felony within the same, whether his
felonious intent be executed or not."); 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS. A TREATISE OF TIE PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 101 (photo. reprint 1978) (1716) ("Burglary is a [f]elony at the [c]ommon [1]aw, in
breaking and entering the [m]ansion [h]ouse of another ... to the [i]ntent to commit some [fjelony
within the same, whether the felonious [i]ntent be executed or not.").
60. See Singley, 392 S.C. at 277. 709 S.E.2d at 606.
61. See Commonwealth v. Majeed, 694 A.2d 336, 338 & n.2 (Pa. 1997) (citing 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at 223).
62. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 21.1(c) (2d ed. 2003) (quoting I
HAWKINS, supra note 59, at 162 (6th ed. 1787)).
63. Id. (citing 3 COKE, supra note 59, at 64).
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committed."64
Prominent eighteenth-century legal scholars affirmed this
habitation-based definition of burglary . In his Commentaries on the Laws of
England, Blackstone asserted that burglary involves "a forcible invasion and
disturbance of that ri ht of habitation, which every individual might acquire even
in a state of nature."
Furthermore, William Hawkins listed burglary as one of
two "[o]ffences against the [h]abitation of a [m]an."67
Modern commentators on American criminal law have also espoused this
traditional burglary framework. 8 In Substantive Criminal Lav, Wayne R.
LaFave stated that "common-law burglary found its theoretical basis in the
protection of man's right of habitation.",0 Charles E. Torcia., author of the
fifteenth edition of WJharton 's Criminal Law, defined the dwelling element as a
matter of occupancy.70 Indeed, Blackstone's "rifht of habitation" undergirds
the Model Penal Code approach to burglary law. The Code's reportorial staff
noted that, although the drafters potentially could have eliminated burglary as a
substantive offense in the Model Penal Code, "the maintenance of a crime of
burglary reflects a considered judgment that especially severe sanctions are
appropriate for criminal invasion of premises under circumstances likely to

64. 3 COKE, supra note 59, at 64 (emphasis added); see also 3 LAFAVE, supra note 62,
§ 21.1(c) ("[T]he basis of the crime [of burglary] was invasion of the right of habitation, and
occupancy rather than ownership was determinative." (citing 3 COKE, supra note 59, at 64)).
65. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at 223-26 (citations omitted); 1 HAWKINS, supra
note 59, at 103-05 (citations omitted).
66. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at 223; see also fajeed, 694 A.2d at 338 n.2 ("The
historical principle underlying the law of burglary is the protection of the right of habitation.'
(citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at 223)).
67.
HA WKINS, supra note 59, at 101. Arson was the other offense against habitation. See
id.
68. See, e.g., 3 LAFAVE, supra note 62, § 21.1(c) (citations omitted) (outlining the burglary
framework); 3 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTONS CRIMINAL LAW § 325 (15th ed. 1995) (citations
omitted) (describing the possessory interest required for burglary). Moreover, the Model Penal
Code codified this framework. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 221.1-.2 explanatory note (1985)
(explaining that the Model Penal Code requires "an unprivileged entry into a building or occupied
structure").
69. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 62, § 21.1(c).
70. 3 TORCIA, supranote 68, § 325 (citations omitted).
71. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at 223.
72. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 221.1-2 explanatory note. Under the Model Penal Code,
"[a] person is guilty of burglary if he enters a building or occupied structure, or separately secured
or occupied portion thereof, with purpose to commit a crime therein, unless the premises are at the
time open to the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 221.1(1). Furthermore, ain "occupied structure" is "any structure, vehicle or place adapted for
overnight accommodation of persons, or for carrying on business therein, whether or not a person is
actually present." MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.0(1).
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terrorize occupants."
Furthermore, the comments to the Model Penal Code
define the protected premises in terms of occupancy rather than ownership.
Thus, by defining "lawful possession""7 in terms of habitation rather than
ownership, the South Carolina Supreme Court aligned its approach to burglary
law with the traditional common law frameworkn-a framework still espoused
by scholars today.
The Singley test79 is, therefore, a rational extension of
entrenched common law principles.so As Part IV reveals, most other state
jurisdictions also have found these principles to be compelling bases for burglary
law.
IV. SINGLEY IN JURISDICTIONAL CONTEXT

In State v. McMillan, the New Hampshire Supreme Court asserted that "[i]t
is generally accepted that burglary statutes are intended to protect the occupant
or possessor of real property."
Although the AcMillan court only considered
cases from five other jurisdictions,8 3 a comparison of the burglary laws from
each state reveals that the court reached the correct conclusion: even though the
burglary law framework differs from state to state, courts in a majority of states
define burglary as a crime against possession.84

73. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 221.1-2 explanatory note (emphasis added). Under the Model
Penal Code approach, burglary could have been treated as "an attempt to commit the intended crime
plus an offense of criminal trespass," thus eliminating the need for separate burglary provisions. Id.
74. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARI ES § 221.1 cmt. 3(b) (1980).
75. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1l-310(3)(a) (2003).
76. See State v. Singley, 392 S.C. 270. 274. 709 S.E.2d 603. 605 (2011) (citing State v.
Clamp, 225 S.C. 89, 102, 80 SE.2d 918, 924 (1954): State v. Alford, 142 S.C. 43, 45, 140 SE. 261,
262 (1927); State v. Trapp, 17 S.C. 467, 471 (1882)).
77. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at 223; 3 COKE, supra note 59, at 64; I HAAWKINS,
s pra note 59. at 101.
78. See sources cited supra note 68.
79. See Singley, 392 S.C. at 277, 709 S.E.2d at 606.
80. See sources cited supra note 59.
81. 973 A.2d 287 (N.H. 2009).
82. Id. at 291 (citing People v. Glanda, 774 N.Y.S.2d 576, 581 (App. Div. 2004); Turner v.
Commonwealth, 531 S.E.2d 619, 621 (Va. CL App. 2000)). The South Carolina Supreme Court
used Mctillan to formulate the Singley test. See Singley, 392 S.C. at 277, 709 S.E.2d at 606: see
also sopra note 53 and accompanying text (quoting the Singley test and supporting text from
Mcill[ilan).
83. Mc
,illan,
973 A.2d at 291-92 (quoting State v. Hagedorn, 679 N.W.2d 666. 670 (Iowa
2004)) (citing Glanda, 774 N.Y.S.2d at 581: Turner. 531 S.E.2d at 621). In addition to the cases

cited in the preceding parenthetical, the court also referred to State v. Lilly and a Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania case. See id. (citing State v. Lilly, 717 N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ohio 1999); Commonwealth
v. Majeed, 694 A.2d 336. 338 (Pa. 1997)). The court also mentioned a second case from New
York. See id. (citing People v. Scott. 760 N.Y.S.2d 828. 831 (Sup. Ct. 2003)).
84. See Hamilton v. State, 219 So. 2d 369, 374 (Ala. 1969) (quoting Fuller v. State, 177 So.
353, 354 (Ala. Ct. App. 1937)); People v. Smith, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 378, 384 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting
People v. Clayton, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536, 538 n.3 (Ct. App. 1998));- People v. Johnson, 906 P.2d 122,
125 (Colo. 1995) (en bane) (citing People v. Barefield, 804 P.2d 1342. 1345 (Colo. App. 1990));
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South Carolina's definition of burglary is not an anomalous one in the
states that compose the Fourth Circuit; all states in this circuit define burglary as
86
87
a crime against possession. In State v. Harold, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina noted that, tinder state case law, possession or occupation constitutes
ownership in burglary cases. 8 According to the court, the policy underlying
burglary law is the "protect[ion of] the habitation of men, where they repose and
sleep, from meditated harm." 89 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
defined burglary in terms of possession or occupation. 90 In Maryland, the court
of appeals asserted that burglary was a crime against habitation at common law
and noted that Maryland's burglary statutes adopted this common law
definition.91
In Turner v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia considered
another joint ownership scenario-spousal burglary of marital property.9 The
defendant in Turner, Henry Levi Turner, separated from his wife in early 1997.94

State v. Fauntleroy, 921 A.2d 622, 629 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-118(a)(5) (West 2012)); State v. Hamilton. 318 A.2d 624, 627 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); In
Interest of M.M., 571 So. 2d 112, 113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting In Interest of M.E., 370
So. 2d 795, 797 (Fla. 1979)); State v. Miller, 622 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000) (quoting
State v. Pace, 602 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Iowa 1999)); Matthews v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 414,
420 (Ky. 1985) (quoting Cladd v. State, 398 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 1981)) (citing State v. Herrin, 453
N.E.2d 1104, 1106 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982); State v. Schneider, 673 P.2d 200, 203 (Wash. Ct. App.
1983)); State v. Champagne, 206 So. 2d 518, 520 (La. 1968) (quoting State v. Simmons, 190 So. 2d
83. 85 (La. 1966)): State v. Cook. 2 A.3d 333, 338 (Me. 2010) (quoting State v. Cookson, 293 A.2d
780, 784-85 (Me. 1972)): McKenzie v. State, 962 A.2d 998, 1002 (Md. 2008); Davis v. State. 163
So. 391, 392 (Miss. 1935) (citing Clinton v. State, 142 So. 17, 18 (Miss. 1932); Brown v. State, 33
So. 170, 170 (Miss. 1903)); State v. Rains, 537 S.W.2d 219, 226 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (citing State
v. Harrison, 285 S.W. 83, 87 (Mo. 1926)) Liakas v. State. 72 N.W.2d 677. 679 (Neb. 1955);
Mcillan. 973 A.2d at 291 (citing Glanda, 774 N.Y.S.2d at 581: Turner, 531 S.E.2d at 621);
Glanda, 774 N.Y.S.2d at 581; State v. Harold, 325 S.E.2d 219, 222 (N.C. 1985) (quoting State v.
Surles, 52 S.E.2d 880, 882 (N.C. 1949)) (citing State v. Beaver, 229 S.E.2d 179, 182 (N.C. 1976));
Lilly, 717 N.E.2d at 327; Calhoun v. State. 820 P.2d 819. 821-22 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991); State v.
Casey, 478 P.2d 414, 415 (Or. Ct. App. 1970); Majeed, 694 A.2d at 338 & n.2 (citing 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at 223); Singley, 392 S.C. at 277, 709 S.E.2d at 606; Hobby v. State,
480 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972); Mack v. State, 928 SW.2d 219, 222 (Tex. App.
1996) (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(35)(A) (West 2011)); Turner, 531 S.E.2d at 621
(quoting Rash v. Commonwealth, 383 S.E.2d 749, 751 (Va. Ct. App. 1989)), Schneider, 673 P.2d at
203 (quoting State v. Klein, 80 P.2d 825, 827 (Wash. 1938)); Newcomb v. Coiner, 178 S.E.2d 155,
157 (W. Va. 1970) (citations omitted).
85. See Singley, 392 S.C. at 277, 709 S.E.2d at 606.
86. See McKenzie, 962 A.2d at 1002; Harold, 325 S.E.2d at 222 (quoting Surles, 52 S.E.2d at
882) (citing Beaver, 229 S.E.2d at 182); Singley, 392 S.C. at 277, 709 S.E.2d at 606: Turner, 531
S.E.2d at 621 (quoting Rash, 383 S.E.2d at 751); Newconb, 178 S.E.2d at 157 (citations omitted).
87. 325 S.E.2dat 219.
88. Id. at 222 (citing Beaver, 229 S.E.2d at 182).
89. Id. (quoting Surles, 52 S.E.2d at 882) (internal quotation mark omitted).
90. See Newcomb. 178 S.E.2d at 157 (citations omitted).
91. See McKenzie, 962 A.2d at 1002.
92. 531 S.E.2d 619 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
93. See id. at 620.
94. Id.
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Turner's wife continued to reside in the jointly owned marital residence, while
Turner found residence elsewhere.
In February 1998, Turner broke into the
marital residence on two separate occasions, and during the second break-in,
Turner shot his wife and one of her acquaintances.96 Turner argued that his
ownership interest precluded conviction for breaking and entering.
The court
disagreed. applying the possession-based definition of burglary instead. 98 After
analyzing the circumstances surrounding the burglary,99 the court concluded that
"[Turner's] proprietary interest was relegated
100 to [his] wife's superior possessory
interest and right to exclusive habitation."o
Two states in the neihboring Eleventh Circuit also define burglary as a
crime against possession.
In Alabama, burglary indictments do entail a
showing of ownership; however, the "ownership" alleged in the indictment "is
not the title, but the occupancy or possession at the time the offense was
committed." 1 Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court distinguished burglary-law
ownership from property-law ownership, noting that "burglary is a disturbance
to habitable security and not to the fee." 10 Georgia's definition of burglary is
more ambiguous.104 Under Georgia law, burglary indictments traditionally had
to demonstrate that the residence burglarized was not the burglar's dwelling but
rather "was occupied by the prosecutor." 10o Ownership was, therefore, "not an
essential ingredient to proving that the premises entered were the 'dwelling place
of another' within the meaning of [Georgia] burglary law."1 06 However, a recent
amendment to Georgia's burglary law defined "dwelling" as "any building,
structure, or portion thereof which is designed or intended for occupancy or
residential use," and established burglary as, inter alia, a crime against "an

95. Id.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
inhabited

See id.
Id. at 620-21.
Id. at 621.
Id. at 622.
Id. Numerous other courts that have analyzed "spousal burglary" of property formerly
by both spouses reached the same conclusion as the Turner court. See, e.g., Parham v.

State, 556 A.2d 280, 284-85 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (citations omitted) (collecting supportive
case law).
101. See Hamilton v. State, 219 So. 2d 369, 374 (Ala. 1969) (quoting Fuller v. State. 177 So.
353, 354 (Ala. Ct. App. 1937)); In Interest of M.E., 370 So. 2d 795, 797 (Fla. 1979) (citing Addison
v. State, 116 So. 629, 630 (Fla. 1928)).
102. Hamilton. 219 So. 2d at 374 (quoting Fuller.177 So. at 353).
103. In Interest off E., 370 So. 2d at 797.
104. Compare Phillips v. State, 263 S.E.2d 480, 481 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (asserting that
occupancy. not ownership, is the key ingredient for purposes of the Georgia burglary law), with GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-7-1 (Supp. 2012) (defining burglary as, inter alia, a crime against "an occupied,
unoccupied, or vacant dwelling house of another").
105. Phillips, 263 S.E.2d at 481 (emphasis added) (quoting iurphy, 234 S.E.2d at 914)
(internal quotation mark omitted).
106. Id. (quoting Muphy, 234 S.E.2d at 914).
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occupied, unoccupied, or vacant dwelling house of another." i0 Under the
amended burglary statute, a person could be convicted for burglarizing a vacant
building that was simply "intended for occupancy" 108 -thus
undermining
Georgia's traditional possession-based definition of burglary. 109 Due to this
current state of ambiguity, Georgia should no longer be counted among the states
that define burglary in terms of possession.'10
However, every state in the Fifth Circuit applies the possession-based
definition of burglary.
Mississippi and Louisiana apply frameworks similar to
those in Alabama and Florida: while a showing of ownership is required for
conviction in these states, "ownership" is defined in terms of possession.112
Texas applies the "greater right to possession" approach, under which ownership
may be shown through "(1) title, (2) possession or (3) a greater right to
possession than the defendant." 1 Although this approach includes title as
method of proving ownership, case law establishes possession as the critical
focus. I
In the Sixth Circuit, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Ohio apply the possessionbased definition of burglary.115 In Tennessee, "title ... follows the possession

107. H.B. 1176, 151st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2012); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 16-71 (Supp. 2012) (containing the amended version of Georgia's burglary law). The basis for these
amendments was a 2011 report by the legislatively created Special Council on Criminal Justice
Reform for Georgians. See SPECI AL COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM FOR GEORGIANS,
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM FOR GEORGIANS 21 (2011); see

also Ga. H.B. 1176 (noting that the Council report formed the basis for the Title 16 amendments, as
well as the amendments to several other statutory provisions). The Council suggested that first
degree burglary cover burglaries of both occupied and unoccupied dwellings. SPECIAL COUNCIL
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM FOR GEORGIANS, supra, at 20.

108. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-7-1 (Supp. 2012) (emphasis added).
109. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 84.
111. See State v. Champagne, 206 So. 2d 518, 520 (La. 1968) (quoting State v. Simmons. 190
So. 2d 83, 85 (La. 1966)), Davis v. State, 163 So. 391, 392 (Miss. 1935) (citing Clinton v. State,
142 So. 17, 18 (Miss. 1932); Brown v. State, 33 So. 170, 170 (Miss. 1903)), Mack v. State, 928
SW.2d 219, 223 (Tex. App. 1996) (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(35)(A) (West
1994)).

112. See Champagne, 206 So. 2d at 520 (quoting Simmons, 190 So. 2d at 85); Davis, 163 So.
391, 392 (citing Clinton, 142 So. at 18; Brown, 33 So. at 170); see also Hamilton, 219 So. 2d at 374
(quoting Fuller, 177 So. at 354) (noting that, for purposes of a burglary indictment, "ownership"
must be alleged in terms of possession or occupancy); In Interest of I.E., 370 So. 2d at 797
("Ownership means any possession which is rightful as against the burglar and is satisfied by proof
of special or temporary ownership, possession, or control." (citing Addison v. State. 116 So. 629.
630 (Fla. 1928))).
113. Davis v. State, 783 S.W.2d 313, 316 (Tex. App. 1990) (citing Alexander v. State, 753
S.W.2d 390, 392-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)), see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(35)(A)
(West 2011) (enumerating the three methods of proving ownership).
114. See Mack. 928 S.W.2d at 223; see also Alexander, 753 S.W.2d at 392 ("[U]nder the
Penal Code, any person who has a greater right to the actual care, custody, control, or management
of the property than the defendant can be alleged as the 'owner.").
115. See Matthews v. Commonwealth, 709 SW.2d 414, 420 (Ky. 1985) (quoting Cladd v.
State. 398 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 1981)) (citing State v. Herrin. 453 N.E.2d 1104, 1106 (Ohio Ct.
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and possession constitutes sufficient ownership as against the burglar." 6 While
discussing spousal burglary of marital property, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
identified possession as the key property right protected by burglary law. 1 As
noted by the Singley court," 8 the Supreme Court of Ohio established custody
and control as the guiding principle used to assess the dwelling burglarized.1
Michigan case law is more ambiguous on this point. 12 0 Traditionally,
Michigan applied the ownership-based definition of burglaryl21 that the Singley
court rejected.12
In the 1915 case of People v. Eggleston,123 the Michigan
Supreme Court considered a convicted burglar's assignments of error regarding
the trial judge's jury charges. 124 One of the respondent's requests to charge
contained an assertion that, because the respondent had a joint deed of the
dwelling burglarized, "if [the respondent] thought that [his] ownership gave him
a right to enter the house if he desired, then he would not be guilty of making a
felonious breaking and entering."
Although the court could not find error in
the trial judge's rejection of this charge,126 the court asserted that "if by reason of
the condition of the title to said property the respondent honestly believed that he
had a right to enter, it is difficult to see how he could have entertained criminal
intent, which is a necessary element of the crime charged."12 Thus, in the early

App. 1982); State v. Schneider, 673 P.2d 200, 203 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983)); State v. Lilly, 717
N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ohio 1999); Hobby v. State, 480 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972)
(citing Hindman v. State, 384 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tenn. 1964); Anderson v. State, 455 S.W.2d 630, 632
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1970); Taylor v. State, 455 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970)).
116. Hobby, 480 SW.2d at 556 (citing Hindman, 384 S.W.2d at 20; Anderson 455 S.W.2d at
632; Taylor, 455 S.W.2d at 170).
117. See Mlatthews. 709 SW.2d at 420 (quoting Cladd, 398 So. 2d at 444) (citing Herrin, 453
N.E.2d at 1106; Schneider, 673 P.2d at 203).
118. See State v. Singley, 392 S.C. 270, 276.709 S.E.2d 603, 606 (2011).
119. See Lilly, 717 N.E.2d at 327.
120. See People v. Eggleston, 152 N.W. 944, 945 (Mich. 1915); People v. Winters, No.
288925, 2010 WL 1979163, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. May 18, 2010); People v. Card, No. 228661,
2001 WL 694507, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2001); People v. Szpara, 492 N.W.2d 804, 806
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Eggleston, 152 N.W. at 945) (citing People v. Gauze. 542 P.2d
1365, 1367 (Cal. 1975)).
121. See Eggleston, 152 N.W. at 945.
122. See Singley, 392 S.C. at 276, 709 S.E.2d at 606.
123. 152 N.W. 944.
124. See id. at 944.
125. Id. at 945. In Michigan, the relevant statute defines burglary with the terms "break[ing]
and enter[ing]'" and "home invasion." See MICH. COmp. LAWS. ANN. § 750.110a(2}-(8) (West
2004 & Supp. 2012). Though the term "burglary" does not actually appear in this statute, the
substantive defense defined therein is the offense of burglary. Compare id (defining burglary in
terms of "break[ing] and enter[ing]" and "home invasion"), with S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-311
(2003) (defining "burglary in the first degree").
126. See Eggleston, 152 N.W. at 945: see also People v. Szpara, 492 NW.2d 804. 806 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Eggleston, 152 N.W. at 945) (noting that the Eggleston court did not decide
"whether the trial court was required to give an instruction that the defendant could not be found
guilty of breaking and entering property of which he was partial owvner").
127. Eggleston, 152 N.W. at 945.
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twentieth century, ownership rights seemed to preclude burglary convictions in
Michigan. 8
In 1992, however, the Michigan Court of Appeals gave the possessory
approach stronger consideration. 12 In People v. Szpara, the court affirmed
the conviction of a burglary defendant who, during the course of a divorce, broke
into the marital home and beat his wife, despite a court order forbidding him
from entering the property.
Citing Eggleston and the California burglary case
of People v. Gauze, the defendant claimed he had been wrongfully charged
with burglarizing his own home. 1 33 While the Eggleston court believed that
titleholders probably could not form the intent necessary to burglarize their own
property,13 4 the Supreme Court of California addressed the possessory rights at
stake, concluding that the right of habitation could not be violated in this
scenario.
Despite these arguments, the court of appeals concluded that,
because of the court order, the defendant had no right to enter the marital
home.13 He, therefore, entered "against the possessory right of [his wife].
Even though the court's language here suggests an acceptance of the
possession-based definition of burglary, the court did not explicitly adopt this
approach. Instead, the court simply could have been using the language of
possession to contrast Gauze with the defendant's situation and ultimately to
reject the defendant's argument. 1 The court of appeals subsequently issued two
unpublished opinions involving claims of ownership in the home burglarized;
however, these opinions do not resolve the ambiguity in the court's approach.139
In both People v. Card140 and People v. Winters,141 the court analyzed the
respective defendant's claims under the statutory standard for entering without
permission-entering "without having obtained permission to enter from the
owner or lessee of the dwelling or from any other person lawfully in possession
or control of the dwelling" 14 -without resolving whether an owner who has no

I28. See id
129. See Szpara, 492 N.W.2d at 806 (citing People v. Gauze. 542 P.2d 1365, 1367 (Cal.
1975)).
130. 492 NW.2d 804.
131. See id at 805.
132. 542 P.2d 1365.
133. See Szpara, 492 NW.2d at 805-06. The Supreme Court of California's holding in Gauze
is discussed turther in the policy section ofthis Comment. See infia Part V.
134. See Eggleston, 152 N.W. at 945.
135. See Szpara, 492 N.W.2d at 806 (citing Gauze, 542 P.2d at 1367).
136. See id at 806.
137. Id (emphasis added).
138. See id. (citing Gauze, 542 P.2d at 1367).
139. See People v. Winters, No. 288925, 2010 WL 1979163, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. May 18,
2010); People v. Card, No. 228661, 2001 WL 694507, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2001).
140. 2001 WL 694507.
141. 2010 WL 1979163.
142. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 750.11oa(1)(c) (West 2004 & Supp. 2012).
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possessory interest in the dwelling can burglarize it.' 14 Thus, Michigan should
not be counted among the plethora of other states that currently apply a
possession-based definition of burglary. 144
On the other hand, the state courts found in the Third Circuit do provide
support for the possession-based approach to burglary law. 145 In Commonwealth
v. Aajeed,146 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania cited Blackstone's
Commentaries for the proposition that burglary law protects possessory rights.147
Likewise, the Delaware Superior Court defined burglary as a crime against
possession-habitation or occupancy"-while contrasting the offenses of
assault and burglary.
In State v. Berkey,149 the New Jersey Superior Court,
Law Division stated that the law
throw[s] around the habitation area of any residence, be it a singlefamily home or a large apartment, a protective mantle so that it may
become a place of family repose free from intrusion by strangers and
secure for the quiet and peace of family members who reside therein.
Anyone who breaches or intrudes into this protective mantle to commit
a crime therein is guilty of burglary.150
Although the Berkey court did not specifically define burglary as a crime against
possession, the "protective mantle" described by the court clearly protects the
right of habitation. 151
Thus, the various approaches to burglary law by the states that compose the
Fourth Circuit and four of the more geographically proximate circuits almost
always include a possession-based definition of burglary.152 Indeed, the majority

143. See 4ttnters, 2010 WL 1979163, at *3; Card, 2001 WL 694507, at *1. In Card, the
burglar had no ownership or possessory interest in the dwelling burglarized; thus, the court had no
reason to determine which property interest was superior. See Card, 2001 WL 694507, at *1. In
4tinters, the defendant claimed he could not be convicted of burglary because he resided with the
victim. See 4tinters, 2010 WL 1979163, at *3. However, the court found no error in the jury's
verdict, as there was evidence the victim did not want the defendant in the house: furthermore, the
defendant "did not have a key to the [victim's] home, his name was not on the lease, and his
personal papers did not list the [victim's] address as his home address." Id. Thus, the court rejected
the defendant's claims because the evidence indicated he lacked both ownership and possession.
See id.
144. See supra note 84.
145. See State v. Hamilton, 318 A.2d 624, 627 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); Commonwealth v.
Majeed, 694 A.2d 336. 338 & n.2 (Pa. 1997) (citing 4 BLACKSTONE. supra note 59, at 223): cf
State v. Berkey. 630 A.2d 855. 857 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993) (describing burglary law as a
"protective mantle" that protects inhabitants).
146. 694 A.2d 336.
147. See id. at 338 n.2 (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at 223).
148. See Hamilton. 318 A.2d at 627.
149. 630 A.2d 855
150. Id at 857.
151. See id.
152. See supra notes 85-151 and accompanying text.
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of state jurisdictions take this approach.'
Thus, in Singley, the South Carolina
Supreme Court applied a broadly accepted principle of burglary lawl54 to a
situation involving a burglar with an ownership interest in the dwelling
holding such ownership interest inferior to the question of
burglarized,'
possession. 156
V. SINGLEI IN POLICY CONTEXT

Although the Singley decision is firmly rooted in the historical definition of
burglary , and is the current consensus definition among state jurisdictions,
the wisdom of the decision as a matter of public policy still must be considered.
Two competing policy concerns arise: (1) the possessor's right to security in his
home 1 and (2) the criminal defendant's interest in avoiding multiple
prosecutions for a single offense.160 On the one hand, "The law of burglary is
primarily designed to secure the sanctity of one's home, especiall at nighttime,
when peace, solitude and safety are most desired and expected." 6 On the other
hand, if the defendant simply committed a crime after entering his "own home
162
prosecuting the defendant for
[sic]"-and therefore did not commit burglary l
burglary would entail charging him twice for a single offense.t6 3
The Singley test164 adequately addresses the first policy concern.165 In
Singley, the South Carolina Supreme Court acknowledged the possessor's right

153. See supra note 84.
154. See supra note 84; see also State v. Singley, 392 S.C. 270, 274, 709 S.E.2d 603, 605
(2011) ("[B]urglary is a crime against possession and habitation, not a crime against ownership."
(citing State v. Clamp, 225 S.C. 89, 102, 80 SE.2d 918, 924 (1954); State v. Alford. 142 S.C. 43,
45, 140 S.E. 261, 262 (1927); State v. Trapp, 17 S.C. 467, 471 (1882))).
155. See Singley, 392 S.C. at 272-73, 709 S.E.2d at 604.
156. See id. at 278, 709 SE.2d at 607.
157. See supra Part III.
158. See supra Part IV.
159. See Singley, 392 S.C. at 276, 709 S.E.2d at 606 (quoting State v. Brooks, 277 S.C. 111,
112-13, 283 S.E.2d 830, 831 (1981)); see also State v. Lilly, 717 N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ohio 1999)
("[T]he purpose of burglary law is to protect the dweller.").
160. See State v. Trapp, 17 S.C. 467, 470 (1882): accord People v. Gauze, 542 P.2d 1365,
1368 (Cal. 1975) ("To impose sanctions for burglary would in effect punish [a defendant] twice for
the crime he committed while in the house.").
161. See Singley, 392 S.C. at 276. 709 S.E.2d at 606 (quoting Brooks. 277 S.C. at 112. 283
S.E.2d at 831 (1981)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
162. See id. at 276, 709 SE.2d at 606 (quoting Trapp, 17 S.C. at 470); see also S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-11-311 (A) (2003) (stating that a person may only be found guilty of first degree burglary
if, inter alia, "the person enters a dwelling without consent"): S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11- 3 10( 3 )(a)
(for purposes of South Carolina's burglary statute, "consent" means "the consent of the person in
lawlii possession").
163. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
164. See Singley, 392 S.C. at 277, 709 S.E.2d at 606.
165. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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to security in his home before propounding its test; 66 indeed, "the right and
expectation to be safe and secure" in such a setting is an explicit element of the
Singley test.167 Singley, therefore, constituted a resounding affirmation of the
possessor's peace and safety interests in his home.168
The second policy concern169 is somewhat more problematic under the
Singley framework.170 The court's acknowledgment of the principle that "one
cannot commit the offence of burglary by breaking into his own home [sic]"171
certainly addresses the main thrust of the multiple prosecution issue,
but the
Singley test7 arguably does not remove the possibility of double prosecution for
a single offense. This test focuses the property analysis on "whether, tinder the
totality of the circumstances, a burglary defendant had custody and control of,
and the right and expectation to be safe and secure in, the dwelling
burglarized.""7 Thus, for a burglary conviction to be precluded by the Singley
test, the defendant must have both a possessory interest and a "right and
expectation" of peace and safety in the dwelling.
But, what if a burglary
defendant has the requisite "right and expectation," but does not have the
custody and control Singley requires?
The Supreme Court of California's policy analysis in Gauze illuminates this
dilemma..
While defending the prohibition of "own home" burglary
convictions, the court noted that
no danger arises from the mere entry of a person into his own home, no
matter what his intent is. He may cause a great deal of mischief once
inside. But no emotional distress is suffered, no panic is engendered,

166. See Singley, 392 S.C. at 276, 709 S.E.2d at 606 (quoting Brooks, 277 S.C. at 112-13, 283
S.E.2d at 831).
167. Id. at 277. 709 S.E.2d at 606.
168. See id. at 276-78, 709 S.E.2dat 606-07 (quoting Brooks, 277 S.C. at 112-13, 283 S.E.2d
at 83 1).
169. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
170. See generally Singley, 392 S.C. at 277. 709 S.E.2d at 606 (establishing burglary as a
crime against both possession and the possessor's right of peace and safety in the dwelling).
171. Id. at 276, 709 S.E.2d at 606 (quoting State v. Trapp, 17 S.C. 467, 470 (1882)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
172. See Trapp, 17 S.C. at 470: see also supra notes 160, 162-63 and accompanying text
(establishing the relationship between the prohibition of "own home" burglary convictions and the
issue of multiple prosecutions for a single offense). In Trapp, the South Carolina Supreme Court
stated two reasons for requiring an allegation of ownership in a burglary indictment: (1) "For the
purpose of showing on the record that the house alleged to have been broken into, was not the
dwelling house of the accused, inasmuch as one cannot commit the offence of burglary by breaking
into his own house" and (2) "[fjor the purpose of so identifying the offence, as to protect the
accused from a second prosecution for the same offence." Trapp, 17 S.C. at 470.
173. See Singley, 392 S.C. at 277, 709 S.E.2d at 606.
174. Id. (emphasis added).
175. Id.
176. See People v. Gauze. 542 P.2d 1365. 1368-69 (Cal. 1975) (citations omitted).
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and no violence necessarily erupts merely because he walks into his
house.
The court then provided examples of "potentially absurd results" that could
occur if the prohibition did not exist: a person could be convicted of burglary for
"calmly entering his house with intent to forge a check" or for "walking into his
home with intent to administer a dose of heroin to himself." even if he later
decided not to commit the crime.178 Absurd as these situations may seem, if a
person can have a "right and expectation" of peace and safety 9 in a residence
over which he does not have custody and control-therefore indicating the
residence is the person's "own home" with regard to the policy underlying
burglary1s but not as a matter of possession 8 -the "own home" concept splits
into two separate definitions that collide, creating the possibility that a person
may indeed burglarize a dwelling in which he has a valid expectation of security.
This scenario would therefore violate the prohibition of "own home" burglary
convictions, as well as the policies underlying this prohibition.
An original hypothetical based partially on the facts of Singleyl84 illustrates
the potential for the multiple prosecution issue to arise inder this case's
framework. This hypothetical involves a burglary defendant similar to Singley
in some ways: he inherited a partial interest in his family home after his father's
death, and he continued to live in the home with his mother, the majority
owner.1
However, the defendant's mother asked him to vacate the premises
specifically because he had become an alcoholic. She told the defendant he had
to begin attending a rehabilitation program at a local inpatient clinic and that he
could not return to the home until he had completed the program. The
defendant's mother made this arrangement because she loved her son and was
concerned for his wellbeing; she believed he could not recover without extensive

177. Id at 1368.
178. Id at 1369. The subject of these examples could be convicted even if the person failed to
commit the intended crime, as burglary occurs upon entry. See id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 459 (West 2012) (defining burglary as entry in certain property "with intent to commit grand or
petit larceny or any felony"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-31 I(A) (2003) (establishing that a person
may only be found guilty of first degree burglary if, inter alia,"the person enters a dwelling without
consent and with intent to commit a crime in the dwelling" (emphasis added)).
179. Singley, 392 S.C. at 277, 709 S.E.2d at 606.
180. See id. at 276, 709 S.E.2d at 606 (quoting State v. Brooks, 277 S.C. 111, 112-13, 283
S.E.2d 830. 831 (1981)).
181. See id. at 278. 709 S.E.2d at 607.
182. Id at 276, 709 S.E.2d at 606 (quoting State v. Trapp, 17 S.C. 467, 470 (1882)); accord
People v. Gauze, 542 P.2d 1365, 1368 (Cal. 1975) ("To impose sanctions for burglary would in
effect punish [a defendant] twice for the crime he committed while in the house.").
183. See Gauze. 542 P.2d at 1368.
184. See text accompanying notes 20-36 (providing the Singley facts).
185. Cf. Singley, 392 S.C. at 272, 709 S.E.2d at 604 (noting that Singley inherited a partial
property interest from his father, that his mother owned the majority interest in the property, and
that Singley continued to reside in the house for some time after inheriting his property interest).
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inpatient therapy.
The defendant-who usually respected his mother's
requests-agreed to this arrangement, taking his belongings and vacating the
186
premises.
Several months passed without incident. The defendant telephoned his
mother regularly and told her about his experiences at the clinic. The
defendant's mother was happy with the defendant's progress, but she never
withdrew her demand that he complete the program before returning home.187
About six months later, the defendant had a severe relapse. He decided to
leave the rehabilitation clinic at night, return home, forge one of his mother's
checks to obtain cash. and use the cash to buy alcohol. He followed through
with this plan, nonchalantly entering his house
after locating a key his mother
kept under the doormat. The defendant's mother was not home at the time of his
entry. 190 After finding his mother's checkbook in its usual place on her dresser,
the defendant forged the check and went to his mother's bank to cash it.
However, the bank recognized the forgery and notified the police. The
defendant was then arrested and charged with forgery and burglary.
In this hypothetical, the defendant relinquished custody and control of the
property: he abandoned the dwelling at his mother's request, took his
possessions with him, and agreed not to return until completing the rehabilitation
program. 191 Furthermore, he did not have his mother's consent to reenter the
dwelling. 192 However, the defendant arguably did not relinquish his "right and
expectation" of peace and safety in the dwelling 19^'-therefore retaining the
ability to call the dwelling his "own home."l94 The defendant and his mother
shared no ill will: the defendant's mother refused to allow the defendant to return

186. Cf Mack v. State, 928 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Tex. App. 1996) (holding that the defendant
cotenant did not have a "greater right to possession" (internal quotation marks omitted) when, inter
alia, he "moved out, removed almost all of his possessions from the apartment," and "agreed not to
visit the apartment unless he first called for permission").
I87. Cf Singley, 392 S.C. at 272, 709 S.E.2d at 604 ("As between Singley and his mother,
Singley did not have permission to return to the house.").
188. Cf id. (noting that Singley's burglary occurred about six months after he vacated the
dwelling).
189. Cf People v. Gauze, 542 P.2d 1365, 1369 (Cal. 1975) (noting that, if a person could
burglarize his own home, he could be found guilty of burglary after "calmly entering his house with
intent to forge a check," which is a "potentially absurd result[]" of such a doctrine (emphasis
added)).
190. In this example, the absence of the defendant's mother at the time of his entry will allow
for certain hypothetical variations on the possible effects of the entry. See infra notes 191-204 and
accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.

193. See generally Singley, 392 S.C. at 277. 709 S.E.2d at 606 (establishing the dweller's
right and expectation" of safety and security as one of the elements of the Singley test).
194. See id. at 276, 709 S.E.2d at 606 (quoting State v. Brooks, 277 S.C. 111, 112-13, 283
S.E.2d 830, 831 (1981)); see also supra notes 171-83 and accompanying text (providing that a
burglary defendant may be able to establish that the dwelling burglarized is his "own home"
through his right to and expectation of peace and safety. if not through lawful possession).
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to the dwelling because she was concerned for his well-being. Had the
defendant's mother seen him reenter the house, she likely would have felt
sadness, surprise, anger, or disappointment; however, his reentry would not have
created the danger that the Gauze court contemplated 195
Of course, the Gauze court also asserted that when a person enters his own
home. "no emotional distress is suffered, no panic is engendered, and no
violence necessarily erupts."1 96 Inferentially, the presence of these elementsemotional distress, panic, and violence-indicates that a person did not, in fact,
have the right to and expectation of peace and safety in the dwelling. Thus,
evaluating the potential effects of the hypothetical defendant's entry1 97 and
comparing them to the negative reactions that the Gauze court listedi98 provides
some indication of the defendant's rights and expectations with regard to peace
and safety.
Had the defendant's mother been present at the time of his entry, the entry
would not have caused violence or panic, given the defendant's relationship with
his mother. The entry may well have caused emotional distress, but it would
have been the distress of a mother suffering at the sight of her wayward child,
not an inhabitant distressed at the sight of a violent intruder.19 9 The existence of
the emotional reactions contemplated in Gauze200 is, of course, far more
ambiguous when the occupant has not formally challenged the burglar's
possessory rights. 20 The Singley framework202 could, therefore, criminalize
family members for engendering emotional harm without the implication of

195. See People v. Gauze, 542 P.2d 1365, 1368 (Cal. 1975): see also supra text accompanying
note 177 (quoting the policy rationale for the prohibition of "own home" burglary convictions
espoused by the Gauze court).
196. Gauze. 542 P.2d at 1368.
197. See id at 1369.
198. See id at 1368.
199. Cf Turner v. Commonwealth, 531 S.E.2d 619, 620 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that, after
the burglary defendant kicked in the door of his wife's trailer, his wife fearfully ran past him and
fled to her mother's house). The distinction here, of course, has nothing to do with the relative
violence of the intended crime; for a person to be found guilty of burglary in South Carolina, the
person must simply have entered the dwelling "with intent to commit a crime." S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-11-311(A) (2003) (emphasis added). However, the difference between the wife's fear in
Turner and the mother's potential distress in the hypothetical is instuctive here: while the former
was inspired by a criminal act, the latter would have been a product of a close, but tormented,
familial relationship. See generally Turner, 531 S.E.2d at 620 (describing a burglary victim's flight
from the premises after the burglar's entry).
200. See Gauze, 542 P.2d at 1368.
201. Cf Brief of Petitioner, supra note 28, at 7 (arguing that the defendant still had a
possessory right in the dwelling because his mother had not formally challenged his right). Indeed,
in Singlev, the defendant's attorney argued on appeal that, because Singley's mother "had taken no
formal steps to terminate his right of possession, habitation and occupancy," Singley should be
acquitted of the burglary charge. Id
202. See State v. Singley, 392 S.C. 270, 277, 709 S.E.2d 603, 606 (2011).
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criminal intent 203-as when a wayward family member reenters his "own
home."204
Thus, as the preceding hypothetical demonstrates, a burglary defendant
could be convicted of burglarizing what appears to be his "own home"-the
place in which he has a right to and an expectation of peace and safety205-under
the Singley test.206 As this outcome entails charging the defendant twice for the
same offense207 and trivializes the other key policy underlying burglary law, 208a
more consistent definition of "own home" should be promulgated in South
Carolina. Luckily, a simple conclusion is readily available: instead of requiring
a showing of both custody and control and a right to and expectation of peace
and safety, 209 the test could simply require a showing of either of these elements.
Therefore, the Singley test could be rewritten as follows: "[T]he proper test is
whether, tinder the totality of the circumstances, a burglary defendant had
custody and control of' or "the right and expectation to be safe and secure in, the
dwelling burglarized."210
This modified test retains the Singley court's
protections of the lawful possessor,211 while also ensuring that a property owner
who has a right to and an expectation of peace and safety in the dwellingindependent of any possessor interest-does not suffer double prosecution for
burglarizing his "own home."1
Perhaps the best venue for change would be the South Carolina General
Assembly, which could incorporate this modified Singley test into South
1
Carolina's statutory framework. 213
' Conversely, the South Carolina Supreme

203. See supra text accompanying notes 191-98. Of course, the burglary defendant in the
preceding hypothetical did, indeed, enter the house with criminal intent. See supra text
accompanying notes 188 90. However, the defendant's mother would not have contemplated such
criminal intent upon his entry. as the defendant was told to leave the house for rehabilitation-not
because she feared he would cause her harm or conduct criminal activity in the house. See supra
text accompanying notes 185-86.
204. See supra text accompanying note 196.
205. See Singley, 392 S.C. at 276, 709 S.E.2d at 606 (quoting State v. Brooks, 277 S.C. 111,
112-13, 283 S.E.2d 830, 831 (1981)).
206. See generally id. at 277, 709 S.E.2d at 606 (establishing the "totality of the
circumstances" test for analyzing the defendant's property interest in the dwelling burglarized).
207. See supra notes 162-63. 169-73 and accompanying text.
208. See generally Singley, 392 S.C. at 276, 709 S.E.2d at 606 (quoting Brooks, 277 S.C. at
112-13, 283 S.E.2d at 831) (establishing the dweller's expectation of and right to peace and safety
in his residence as "the very purpose behind the law of burglary").
209. See generally id. at 277, 709 S.E.2d at 606 (enumerating the current Singley test).
210. For the current Singley test, see id
211. See id. at 274. 709 S.E.2d at 605.
212. See supra notes 162-63, 169-73 and accompanying text.
213. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1l-310(3)(a) (2003) (establishing "the consent ofthe
person in lawlul possession" as the requisite consent for purposes of burglary law). This statute
provides the requisite definitions for South Carolina's first, second. and third degree burglary
statutes. See id. Thus, it may be an ideal place to enumerate the modified Singley test.
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Court could grant certiorari to a similar case to modify its Singley test.214 Either
way, South Carolina's burglary laws should balance the rights of the possessor
with the burglary defendant's interest in avoiding double prosecution for a single
offense.215
VI. CONCLUSION

Henry Louis Gates would not be guilty of burglary if the bizarre events
surrounding his arrest 1 occurred in South Carolina.-l
Even if Gates had the
criminal intent necessary for a burglary conviction 8-which he obviously did
not 19 -the South Carolina Supreme Court previously affirmed the classic
principle that a person cannot burglarize his own home.220 Of course, because
the house "burglarized" was Gates's own home,
Gates would have also met
the dual standards established in Singley-custody and control of the property, as
well as the expectation of peace and security therein.222
However, some property owners may have an expectation of peace and
security in a dwelling without having custody and control of the property.
Under the Singley framework, these property owners could conceivably be
convicted of burglarizing dwellings that resemble their "own homes"-minus
the required possessory interest. The South Carolina General Assembly should,
therefore, incorporate a modified version of the Singley test, under which the
expectation of peace and security in the dwelling burglarized acts as an
independent element of burglary convictions.
This test would protect criminal
defendants from overprosecution while maintaining protections for the
225
inhabitants of residential property.

214. Of course, this approach has an obvious practical drawback: it requires a factually
specific set of circumstances that may not arise in the near future. Cf Murdaugh v. Robert Lee
Constr. Co., 185 S.C. 497, 504-05, 194 S.E. 447, 451 (1937) (noting in a civil case that the South
Carolina Supreme Court "is limited to deciding questions of law" and, therefore, "may not pass
upon the force and effect of [the facts in the record]"). Indeed. it would be preferable if those with
ownership interests in property did not hold possessors at knife point.
215. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text.
217. See generallySingley, 392 S.C. at 277, 709 S.E.2d at 606 (determining the property rights
that preclude convictions for burglary).
218. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-311(A).
219. See generally Goodnough, supra note 1. at A13 (describing the circumstances
surrounding Gates's arrest).
220. See Singley, 392 S.C. at 276, 709 S.E.2d at 606 (quoting State v. Trapp, 17 S.C. 467, 470
(1882)).
221. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
222. See Singlev, 392 S.C. at 277, 709 S.E.2d at 606.
223. See supra text accompanying note 176.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 210-12.
225. See supra Part V.
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The Singley court's definition of burglary226 is consistent with the classic
theoretical definition of the crime,
as well as the approach to burglary law
taken by courts in a majority of the states.228 Furthermore, this definition

properly protects the dweller's habitation rights.229

If the South Carolina

General Assembly codifies the Singley test with the modification proposed
above,230 the Singley framework would also protect burglary defendants from
multiple prosecutions for a single offense.231 South Carolina's burglary law
should protect Ferris Singley's mother in her place of residence. However, it
should also protect burglary defendants who, due to their expectation of peace
and security in the dwelling burglarized, are no more guilty of burglary than
Henry Louis Gates.
Stephen D. Sutherland

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

See
See
See
See
See
See

Singley, 392 S.C. at 277. 709 S.E.2d at 606.
supra Part III.
supra Part IV.
supra Part V.
supra text accompanying note 210.
supra Part V.
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